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REASONABLE PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENSE: 
RECOGNIZING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACT REASONABLENESS AND 
EMOTION REASONABLENESS 
 
Cynthia Lee* 
 
 All of us can empathize with the individual who has just found out that his or her 
intimate partner has been unfaithful.  Anger, outrage, sadness, a feeling of worthlessness, 
depression – all are understandable emotional responses to the betrayal of trust that 
comes with infidelity.  It is eminently reasonable to feel these strong emotions.  Provoked 
killers, however, go beyond feeling outraged.  They act on their emotions in the most 
extreme way – by taking a human life.  Most of us would not kill, even if we were 
extremely upset.  Yet the provocation doctrine partially excuses an act of killing if the 
defendant’s emotional response is considered reasonable.  If a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion, then the provoked 
killer is acquitted of murder and convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  The provoked killer receives this mitigation even if the reasonable person 
would not have acted the way he did because provocation doctrine does not require that 
his act be reasonable. 
 We can also empathize with the individual who is afraid of being physically 
harmed by another person.  An individual can have differing degrees of fear depending 
on the situation.  In The Gift of Fear, Gavin de Becker describes a woman with a gut 
feeling that the stranger who has offered to carry her groceries has an ulterior motive for 
being so nice.1  It would be foolish if that woman ignored her gut feeling.  Ignoring one’s 
intuition can place one in harm’s way.  There is, however, a difference between 
preventive action, such as refusing the suspicious offer of assistance, and preemptive 
action, such as shooting the man.  It would hardly be reasonable for the woman to take 
out a gun and shoot the stranger before he did anything to confirm her gut feeling. 
 As these examples suggest, there is a difference between reasonable emotions 
(fear, anger, outrage) and reasonable action.  Even if a particular emotion is reasonable 
under the circumstances, this does not mean that acting on that emotion by using deadly 
force is also reasonable.  It may be reasonable to feel anger at one’s unfaithful partner, 
but not reasonable to act on that anger by killing the partner.  It may be reasonable to fear 
an attack, but if that attack is not imminent or if one can avoid that attack by running 
away or disabling the attacker, then killing may not be a reasonable response. 
 It makes sense to engage in separate inquiries regarding the reasonableness of a 
given action and the reasonableness of the emotions leading to that action. Yet jurors in 
provocation and self-defense cases are usually instructed to focus upon the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s emotions (or beliefs), and thus pay little or no attention 
to the reasonableness of the defendant’s acts. 
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I.  Provocation 
 
 In modern jurisdictions, the key issue in a provocation case is whether legally 
adequate provocation was present.  Legally adequate provocation is said to exist if the 
defendant was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion.  One could interpret this 
ambiguous language as requiring what I call “act reasonableness,” a finding that a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have responded or acted as the 
defendant did.  An unscientific survey of model jury instructions used in the fifty states, 
however, indicates that only a few states require act reasonableness.  Most states require 
what I call “emotion reasonableness,” a finding that the defendant’s emotional outrage or 
passion was reasonable.  An example of “emotion reasonableness” is found in Illinois’ 
model jury instructions, which tell jurors that legally adequate provocation is “conduct 
sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.”2  
 The reluctance to require “act reasonableness” stems from the belief that the act 
of killing in the heat of passion is never reasonable.  I agree.  The provoked killer’s 
actions are wrongful as a matter of law, which is why he does not receive a complete 
acquittal.  We do not want others to emulate the behavior.  We mitigate the charges only 
because we feel sympathy for the provoked killer.  But requiring the jury to focus on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions does not mean they must find it was reasonable 
for the defendant to kill.  Rather, act reasonableness can be satisfied if the provoking 
incident would have provoked an ordinary person to violence.   
 Jeremy Horder provides a useful explanation of the difference between reasonable 
feelings of anger (reasonable emotions) and reasonable action in anger (reasonable acts).  
According to Horder, a reasonable feeling of anger means “being angered for the right 
reason, at the right time, to the right extent, and so on.”3 In other words, one’s emotional 
response is considered reasonable if one has the right amount of anger and outrage 
relative to the provoking incident.  For example, if someone kidnaps your family and 
tortures them, a reasonable emotional response is to be very angry.  If you are only 
moderately angry, your emotional response is not reasonable because it is too small.  If, 
on the other hand, you feel violently outraged at a baby’s persistent crying, your 
emotional response would probably be perceived as unreasonable and excessive.   
 In contrast, reasonable action in anger means proportional retaliation against the 
person who has wronged you.  “For men of honour . . . , to act justly in the face of an 
affront or other injustice is to inflict proportional requital, retaliation of the correct 
amount, on the perpetrator of the injustice.”4 In other words, reasonable action in 
provocation means action which is proportionate to the provocation.  For example, if V 
slaps D for no reason at all and D responds by hitting V once or perhaps even twice, one 
can say that D’s response is proportionate to the initial wrong, and therefore reasonable.  
If D were to instead take out a knife and stab V to death, his response would likely be 
deemed unreasonable because a fatal stabbing is grossly disproportionate to a slap.   
 Under a proportionality principle, the reasonableness of the provoked defendant’s 
action depends on the type of force and degree of force used in relation to the triggering 
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provocation.  Proportionality does not mean that the provoked defendant must respond 
with force equal to the force used by the provoker as provocation doctrine partially 
excuses the use of deadly force even when the provoker does not use any force at all.  
The defendant’s act, however, must be seen by the jury as commensurate with the wrong 
inflicted by the provoking party.    
 Some would reject a proportionality requirement in provocation doctrine on the 
ground that once a person has been provoked into a heat of passion, he cannot control the 
mode or degree of force he uses to retaliate against his provoker.  This criticism might be 
persuasive if the presence of passion completely obliterated the ability to control one’s 
actions.  The law, however, assumes that there are degrees of loss of self-control.  If the 
provoked killer completely lacked the capacity to control his acts, then it would not be 
just to punish him at all.  But we do punish provoked killers, albeit less severely than 
murderers.  The treatment of provocation as only a partial defense reflects the assumption 
that the provoked killer’s loss of self-control is not complete. 
 Act reasonableness does not mean the defendant’s response must be strictly 
proportionate to the alleged provocation.  Proportionality is merely suggested as a tool to 
help jurors think about whether the defendant’s acts should be deemed reasonable.  
 
II.  Self-Defense 
 
 A similar distinction between emotion reasonableness and act reasonableness 
exists in the self-defense arena.  Even though act reasonableness is implied in self-
defense doctrine’s proportionality requirement, jury instructions on self-defense tend to 
focus only on emotion (or belief) reasonableness.  Jurors are instructed to find that the 
defendant reasonably believed (or reasonably feared) deadly force was necessary to 
counter an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily injury.  Jurors are not instructed to 
separately find that the defendant’s act of shooting or stabbing or beating the victim was 
reasonable.   
 This focus on reasonable beliefs reflects the presumption that a defendant who 
reasonably fears imminent death or grievous bodily harm acts reasonably when he resorts 
to deadly force.  In most cases, a correlation between reasonable fears and reasonable acts 
will exist.  However, just because someone has a reasonable belief that another poses an 
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury does not necessarily mean a particular 
action leading to death is reasonable.   
 For example, in State v. Dill,5 two men in the parking lot of a bar a little before 
midnight were having trouble getting their truck to start because of a low battery.  One of 
the men, Terry Greenwood, walked over to another car in the lot and asked the three 
occupants whether they could give him a jump.  One of the passengers in that car offered 
to give Greenwood a jump for $5.00.  Offended that the men would not help him for free, 
Greenwood began to argue loudly with the passenger and then walked towards the 
driver’s side of the car.  Defendant Dill was sitting in the driver’s seat with the window 
down.  Suddenly, Dill saw Greenwood lunge toward the open car window with a knife.  
Dill responded by reaching for a loaded gun from between the seats of the car.  He 
opened the car door, and shot Greenwood in the head.  Greenwood died a short time later. 
 Dill was charged with Greenwood’s murder.  At trial, Dill argued he shot 
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Greenwood in self-defense.  Like most self-defense statutes, Louisiana’s statute focused 
exclusively on the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs, providing that a homicide is 
justifiable “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is 
in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is 
necessary to save himself from that danger . . ..”6 Rejecting Dill’s claim of self-defense, 
the jury found Dill guilty of manslaughter.  
 In affirming Dill’s conviction, the Louisiana Court of Appeals found that even 
though Dill’s belief in the need to act in self-defense was reasonable, his act of shooting 
Greenwood was not.  The court explains why Dill’s fear was reasonable in the following 
passage: 
 
There is no question that the two men were engaged in a heated argument 
at the time of the shooting.  The victim approached the car during the 
encounter to continue the altercation.  From the relative sizes of the two 
men it appears that Dill (5'4, 145 lbs.) would have received the worst end 
in a fight, even if the victim (6'0, 200 lbs.) had been unarmed.  
Accordingly, [Dill’s] apprehension of receiving great bodily harm could 
be deemed reasonable.7  
 
 Even though Dill’s fear of bodily harm was reasonable, the appellate court 
affirmed Dill’s conviction because Dill’s act of shooting Greenwood in the head at close 
range was not reasonable.  In drawing this conclusion, the court pointed to several less 
fatal alternatives Dill might have employed to avoid the threatened harm.  
 
In the present case, it would appear that the trier of fact could readily 
conclude that the defendant possessed the ability to retreat or withdraw 
from the impending conflict.  He was in an automobile.  It was possible to 
have driven off or at the very least, rolled up the window to prevent any 
attack by the victim . . . it was likewise evident that deadly force was not 
mandated by the situation.  By the defendant’s own admission he issued 
no warning to the victim.  Nor, apparently when firing at a close range did 
he aim for a less vital area than the head.8 
 
 State v. Garrison likewise illustrates the difference between reasonable fear of 
great bodily harm and reasonable action in self-defense.9  Jessie Garrison went to visit his 
sister at her apartment.  Jeremiah Sharp, his sister’s former boyfriend, showed up drunk 
and belligerent and began arguing with Garrison’s sister.  Garrison intervened, and his 
sister left the room.  During the argument, Sharp reached for a pistol in his waistband.  
Because of Sharp’s intoxicated state, Garrison was able to remove the pistol from Sharp’s 
waistband.  Sharp then grabbed a steak knife and advanced towards Garrison with the 
knife raised high.  Garrison backed up and, using the pistol he’d just retrieved from 
Sharp, fired at Sharp’s left ankle.  Garrison then fired one more shot which killed Sharp.   
                                                 
6  Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). 
7  Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). 
8  Id. at 1138. 
9  State v. Garrison, 525 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1987). 
4 
 
5 
 
 Garrison was charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm.  At 
trial, Garrison argued that he acted in self-defense.  The trial court could have found that 
Garrison’s fear of grievous bodily harm was reasonable since Sharp was advancing 
towards Garrison with a knife.  Nonetheless, the court rejected Garrison’s self-defense 
argument on the ground that Garrison’s act of shooting Sharp was unreasonable.  
According to the trial court, Garrison’s act of shooting was unreasonable because less 
drastic alternatives were available to avoid the threatened harm.  Garrison could have 
retreated or he could have again disarmed Sharp, especially after Sharp was shot in the 
left ankle. 
 A person who honestly and reasonably fears imminent death or great bodily harm 
does not necessarily act reasonably if he uses deadly force in self-defense.  The type and 
degree of force used by the defendant to ward off the threat may or may not be 
reasonable depending upon the gravity of the threatened harm and whether less deadly 
alternatives were available to deal with the threatened harm.  Recognizing the distinction 
between reasonable beliefs and reasonable acts would go a long way towards ensuring 
that outcomes in self-defense cases reflect appropriate judgments about the use of deadly 
force. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 With respect to self-defense, what I propose is not a radical reform of current 
doctrine.   Self-defense doctrine already includes a reasonable act requirement.  The 
defendant’s response to the aggressor’s threat must be reasonably necessary to avert that 
threat, and it must be proportionate to that threat.  Implicit in both the necessity and 
proportionality requirements is the notion that the defendant’s acts must be reasonable in 
light of the threat.  The problem is that most model jury instructions on self-defense fail 
to tell jurors that they should scrutinize the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions.  
My proposal would simply make explicit that which is implicit in current self-defense 
doctrine. 
 With respect to provocation, only a few jurisdictions currently require jurors to 
consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s acts.  Therefore, unlike self-defense 
doctrine, which already includes a reasonable act requirement, requiring act 
reasonableness in provocation doctrine would constitute a departure from current practice 
in most jurisdictions.  This departure is well worthwhile.  Requiring act reasonableness in 
the form of relative proportionality serves to remind jurors that one who takes a human 
life and claims he was reasonably provoked should expect some scrutiny of his or her 
claim of reasonableness. 
